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Abstract 
Using an endogenous portfolio choice model, this paper examines how different monetary policy 
regimes can lead to different foreign currency positions by changing the cyclical properties of the 
nominal exchange rate. We find that strict inflation targeting regimes are associated with a short 
position in foreign currency, while the opposite is true for noninflation targeting regimes. We also 
explore how these different external positions affect the international transmission of monetary 
shocks through the valuation channel. When central banks follow inflation targeting Taylor-type 
rules, valuation effects of monetary expansions are beggar-thy-self, but they are beggar-thy-
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Over the past decade, international ￿nancial markets have become increasingly integrated. This
process of ￿nancial globalisation is re￿ ected in the rapid expansion of the external balance sheets
of countries which records cross-border ownership of assets and liabilities (see Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006) and Lane and Shambough (2009)). In this world of interlinked balance sheets,
exchange rate movements can give rise to large valuation e⁄ects. In fact, recent shifts in US and
UK external positions have been attributed to currency movements (see Higgins et al (2007) and
Astley et al (2009)). This paper looks at the interplay between monetary policy rules and foreign
asset positions in two ways. First, it examines how di⁄erent monetary policy regimes can lead
to di⁄erent foreign currency positions in external balance sheets. Second, it explores how these
di⁄erent foreign currency positions a⁄ect the valuation e⁄ect of monetary shocks.
Lane and Shambough (2010) present evidence that the covariance between nominal exchange
rates and output ￿ uctuations is an important determinant of foreign currency exposure. In par-
ticular, they ￿nd that countries where domestic currency tends to depreciate in bad times are
associated with longer foreign currency positions in their external balance sheets. At the same
time, Clarida and Waldman (2007) show how monetary policy regimes a⁄ect the covariance be-
tween exchange rates and in￿ ation and hence the comovements between in￿ ation and output. They
￿nd evidence that in response to bad news about in￿ ation, domestic currency tends to appreciate in
in￿ ation-targeting countries, but depreciate in non in￿ ation targeters. Arguably, these two pieces
of evidence would suggest an indirect link between monetary policy regimes and external positions.
In particular, together these facts would indicate that non in￿ ation targeting countries are inclined
to have longer positions in foreign currency than in￿ ation-targeting countries.
The main contribution of this paper is to formalise this link between monetary policy and
foreign asset holdings, emphasising the role of monetary policy regimes in determining the cyclical
properties of nominal exchange rates. Consistent with the conjecture above, in our framework
countries in which monetary policy does not focus solely on in￿ ation stabilisation will tend to hold
a portfolio weighted towards foreign currency denominated bonds. For example, if the central
bank is assumed to target money growth, agents would choose a portfolio that is short in domestic
bonds and long in foreign bonds. This is because, with a money-growth rule, any adverse real
country-speci￿c shocks will be associated with a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency.
Holding domestic currency denominated assets is therefore a bad hedge. On the other hand, when
the central bank conducts policy through a Taylor-type rule that responds only to in￿ ation, the
same adverse shock will trigger a nominal domestic currency appreciation. So holding domestic
currency denominated assets is a good hedge and agents will choose to hold an optimal portfolio
that is overweight in home bonds.
1These results are shown analytically in a two-country ￿ exible price model with incomplete
markets, where there is international asset trade in nominal bonds. We also consider an extension
where we allow for international trade in equities as well as bonds. We show numerically that the
model￿ s link between monetary policy and foreign currency positions is robust provided that we
add an extra source of risk to keep the ￿nancial markets incomplete. In addition, we demonstrate
that the results also hold in a model where prices are sticky - irrespective of whether exports are
invoiced in local currency or in the currency of the producer. Moreover, the portfolio shares in the
sticky price set-up are quantitatively similar to that in the ￿ exible price model. Finally, we show
that the results obtained under a money-growth rule also hold under a Taylor rule that puts weight
on stabilising output growth. So the crucial determinant of portfolios in our analysis is whether
policy is su¢ ciently focused on in￿ ation stabilisation.
Nominal bond portfolios have been analysed before by, among others, Devereux and Sutherland
(2008b) and Engel and Matsumoto (2009).1 In a model where monetary policy is speci￿ed as a
Taylor rule that reacts to PPI in￿ ation, Devereux and Sutherland (2008b) ￿nds a negative position
in foreign bonds under incomplete markets.2 Our results show that this ￿nding is overturned if the
central bank follows a money-growth rule, or a ￿ passive￿monetary policy. On the other hand, Engel
and Matsumoto (2009), under a similar money-growth rule ￿nd that the negative foreign currency
position would still be optimal when asset markets are complete. So overall, our results highlight
the importance of both the asset market structure and the policy rule speci￿cation as determinants
of foreign currency positions.
Our paper also examines how foreign currency positions a⁄ect the valuation e⁄ect of monetary
shocks. In our model, a domestic monetary loosening which depreciates the domestic currency
will have positive or negative valuation e⁄ects depending on the country￿ s position in the foreign
currency market. Under an in￿ ation-targeting Taylor-type rule, it is optimal to be short in foreign
currency so a domestic currency depreciation generates a decrease in net external wealth of domestic
agents. Hence, valuation e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks are beggar-thy-self. Conversely, if the
domestic portfolio is long in foreign bonds, as under a money-growth rule, then a domestic monetary
policy loosening would trigger an increase in net external wealth and international valuations e⁄ects
are beggar-thy-neighbour.
The valuation channel of monetary policy has been explored in earlier literature. For instance,
Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) and Svensson (1989) and later Kim (2002) examine the implications
of net foreign asset positions for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a setting in
1Devereux and Sutherland (2008a), Benigno and Nistico (2009), Benigno and Kucuk-Tuger (2010) and Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2009) are other examples of open economy DSGE models with endogenous nominal bond portfolios.
2This is true under the regularity condition which ensures that a positive technology shock at home deteriorates
the home terms of trade.
2which portfolio positions are exogenous.3 Until recently, the analysis of optimal portfolio choice was
mostly restricted to partial equilibrium models. But new methodological contributions (Devereux
and Sutherland (2008a), Tille and van Wincoop (2007) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2007)) have
now allowed us to analyse optimal portfolio choice in general equilibrium models. Therefore, in
this paper we revisit the old insights from Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) and Svensson (1989) in a
two-country general equilibrium model where agents can choose optimally among home and foreign
nominal bonds.
In our analysis, as in Devereux and Sutherland (2008b), monetary policy shocks can have real
e⁄ects even when all prices are fully ￿ exible as long as ￿nancial markets are incomplete. In a set-up
where agents optimally choose to hold a portfolio of nominal bonds that are either denominated in
domestic or foreign currency, monetary shocks will generate endogenous currency movements that
trigger international valuation e⁄ects.4 These valuation e⁄ects on international bond portfolios
that work through unanticipated nominal exchange rate depreciation would still be present when
trade in real assets (equities) is also allowed, provided that there is an extra source of risk in the
model such that trade in equities and bonds cannot complete the markets.
Quantitatively, our results points to small valuation e⁄ects in that, changes in net external
wealth due to the valuation channel have a small e⁄ect on consumption and other real variables.
This result is consistent with both empirical and earlier theoretical literature. Labhard et al (2005)
and Fair (2004) ￿nd that a 1% change in aggregate wealth has less than 0.03% e⁄ect on steady-state
consumption in the United Kingdom and United States. In addition, Chari et al (2002), Baxter and
Crucini (1995) and Betts and Devereux (2001) show that international wealth transfers also tend to
be small in theoretical models. But we also ￿nd that the valuation channel becomes more important
in an economy that is subject to more persistent shocks. Increasing the persistence of shocks means
that agents are exposed to more country-speci￿c risks which they want to hedge against by holding
a larger gross portfolio position. Then monetary shocks become more potent and can trigger larger
valuation e⁄ects when gross positions are very large - perhaps even unrealistically large. We do
not think it is necessarily desirable to have a set-up which implies very strong wealth e⁄ects given
the aforementioned empirical literature. Thus, what we aim to achieve in this paper is a good
understanding of the valuation channel, acknowledging (and demonstrating) that its quantitative
importance is small relative to other channels such as the one coming from sticky prices.5
3Neumeyer (1998) analyses how a monetary union a⁄ects welfare by changing the hedging properties of currencies
in an incomplete market setting with nominal securities and mean-variance preferences. Doepke and Schneider (2006)
look at the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on the redistribution of wealth between old and young generations in a closed economy
model with trade in nominal assets.
4We focus on valuation e⁄ects caused by unanticipated movements in the nominal exchange rate. Devereux and
Sutherland (2010) show that anticipated valuation e⁄ects (risk premia) are small.
5The cross-border implication of monetary policy has already been thoroughly examined in the New Open Economy
Macro literature. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Corsetti et al (2000) showed that monetary expansions can be beggar-
3The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the ￿ exible price model
with trade in nominal bonds. Section 3 focuses on the derivation of the optimal foreign currency
position under di⁄erent monetary policy regimes, and in Subsection 3.3 we analyse valuation e⁄ects
of monetary policy shocks implied by these positions. Section 4 is devoted to our quantitative
analysis and model extensions. We start by illustrating our results under ￿ exible prices numerically
(Subsection 4.1). The model is then extended to allow for trade in equities (Subsection 4.2). Finally,
in Subsection 4.3, we consider the case in which prices are sticky. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We develop a basic two-country open economy model with tradable endowments. There is a home
and a foreign country, each endowed with its own tradable good. Households maximise utility over
in￿nite horizon and they can trade in home and foreign nominal bonds; one-period risk-free bonds
that pay one unit of the currency they are issued in.6
2.1 Consumers






























where C is consumption, M
P is real money holdings.7 ￿s is the discount factor, which is determined
as follows:
thy-self in a micro-founded version of the Mundell-Fleming model. When prices are sticky, currency depreciations
coming from such shocks lead to a deterioration in the country￿ s purchasing power. So this literature focuses on
the cross-border implications of policy shocks coming from expenditure-switching e⁄ects that would only be present
under sticky prices. Our work, on the other hand, concentrates on the wealth e⁄ects which are present even under
￿ exible prices.
6See Section 4.2 for a brief account of the case where equities are traded alongside bonds.
7While agents￿preferences towards di⁄erent bonds are determined through an endogenous portfolio choice problem,
preferences toward currency (or cash) are exogenously imposed in the utility function. Our speci￿cation is equivalent
to the one in which agents can only do transactions with (domestic) currency ￿that is, they face cash-in advance
constraint. And these constraints directly determine the demand for money. Although this is out of the scope of this
paper, one could think of an alternative speci￿cation in which the choice of money holdings is also an outcome of a
portfolio decision.
4￿s+1 = ￿s￿(CAs); ￿0 = 1 (3)
where CA is aggregate home consumption and 0 < ￿(CA) < 1: To achieve stationarity under
incomplete market speci￿cation, we assume ￿C(CA) ￿ 0; which implies that agents discount the
future more as aggregate consumption increases, ie agents bring consumption forward when aggre-
gate consumption is high.8 We assume that the individual takes CA as given when optimising and




with 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿ and 0 < ! ￿ C
￿￿
A < 1 (as in the constant discount factor).


















where ￿ is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between CH and CF and ￿ is the weight
that the household assigns to home consumption. The consumption price index, de￿ned as the









We adopt a similar preference speci￿cation for the foreign country except that variables are denoted
with an asterisk.
In each country agents can invest in two nominal bonds denominated in the home and foreign
currency. The budget constraint of the home agent in real terms is given by:
￿H;t + ￿F;t +
Mt
Pt








￿ Ct ￿ Tt (7)
where Y is the endowment received by home agents, C is consumption of home agents, T represents
real taxes minus transfers. The role of Tt will be to allow for variations in the nominal supply of





Pt : ￿H;t￿1 and ￿F;t￿1 are the real holdings of home and foreign
bonds expressed in units of home consumption good, purchased at the end of period t￿1 for holding
8Another way of ensuring stationarity is to assume, following Turnovsky (1985), that the international trade of
foreign currency denominated bonds is subject to intermediation costs.
















where ZH and Z￿
F are bond prices in terms of home and foreign consumption baskets, respectively.
Qt is the real exchange rate de￿ned as
P￿
t St
Pt : Nominal returns (in home currency) for each of these
assets will be given by Ri;t = ri;t
Pt
Pt￿1 for i = H;F:
Endowments in each country follow an AR(1) process:
logYt = ￿Y logYt￿1 + "Y;t; Et￿1["Y;t] = 0; V ar["Y;t] = ￿2
Y
logY ￿
t = ￿Y logY ￿
t￿1 + "Y ￿;t; Et￿1["Y ￿;t] = 0; V ar["Y ￿;t] = ￿￿2
Y
De￿ning NFAt = ￿H;t + ￿F;t as the total net claims of home agents on the foreign country at
the end of period t (ie the net foreign assets of home agents) and rx;t = rF;t ￿ rH;t as the excess
return of foreign bond on home bond, we write the home budget constraint as follows:10












Note that once ￿F is determined, ￿H; ￿￿
H and ￿￿
F will also be determined as ￿H = NFA￿￿F
by de￿nition and ￿￿
H = ￿￿H, ￿￿
F = ￿￿F from market clearing conditions. Thus, we let ￿F ￿ ￿
and only focus on ￿ in what follows.
2.2 Policy rules
To examine how the choice of monetary policy regime a⁄ects foreign currency positions and val-
uation e⁄ects, we consider two extreme policy speci￿cations: a Taylor rule that only responds to
in￿ ation and a money-growth rule with no feedback to another variable. The former represents an
￿ active￿central bank, which sets interest rates to o⁄set the e⁄ects of shocks on in￿ ation. The latter,
on the other hand, represents a ￿ passive￿central bank, which does not respond to in￿ ation or any






F;t￿1 denote the foreign country￿ s real holdings of home and foreign bonds, expressed in units
of home consumption good. Bonds are assumed to be in net zero supply in each country. Thus, equilibrium in
asset market requires that total bond holdings of home and foreign agents should equal zero, ie ￿H;t + ￿
￿




10Net foreign assets of home agent is de￿ned as net claims of home country on foreign country assets, ie NFAt =
￿F;t ￿ ￿
￿
H;t: Since bonds are assumed to be in net zero supply ￿H;t = ￿￿
￿
H;t: It follows that NFAt = ￿H;t + ￿F;t:
6other variable at all. We also consider Taylor rules which feedback to domestic output as well as
in￿ ation and show in Section 5 that a Taylor rule which puts su¢ cient weight on output stabil-
isation has similar implications for foreign currency positions and valuation e⁄ects as a ￿ passive￿
money-growth rule.
Under the in￿ ation-targeting Taylor rule, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate on
domestic bonds in response to CPI in￿ ation (in￿ ation target assumed to be zero):






exp("R;t); Et￿1["R;t] = 0; V ar["R;t] = ￿2
R
R￿









R;t);Et￿1["R￿;t] = 0; V ar["R￿;t] = ￿￿2
R
Under the money-growth rule, the central bank sets the rate of growth of the money supply. 11





t￿1 + "M￿;t; Et￿1["M￿;t] = 0; V ar["M￿;t] = ￿2
m













: Monetary shocks di⁄er with respect to the monetary
policy speci￿cation we are considering.
2.3 Equilibrium





t+1ri;t+1; i = H;F (10)
where ￿(Ct) = !C
￿￿
t from (4) since in equilibrium aggregate consumption, CA;t; is equal to in-
dividual consumption, Ct: Money demand depends negatively on the opportunity cost of holding
money, which is equal to
Ri;t+1￿1











Equilibrium bond prices, ZH and Z￿
F; are obtained by substituting rH;t+1 and r￿
F;t+1 from (8)
11Under both rules, steady-state in￿ ation is zero. But our results would go through with non-zero steady-state
in￿ ation.



















































We assume that law of one price holds, ie P￿
H;t =
PH;t
St and PF;t = P￿
F;tSt:
2.4 Approximated solution
To solve the model we use the approximation techniques proposed in Devereux and Sutherland
(2008a) and Tille and van Wincoop (2007). We approximate our model around the symmetric
steady state in which steady-state in￿ ation rates are assumed to be zero.
To determine the portfolio allocation, it is useful to rewrite the home portfolio choice equation































, respectively, and rx;t+1 is the excess return on foreign nominal bond, taking home
bond as a reference.
These two sets of conditions imply the following equation that characterises optimal portfolio
choice up to a second order:
Et
h
(^  t+1 ￿ ^  
￿
t+1 + ￿ ^ Qt+1)^ rx;t+1
i
= 0 + O("2)
This is an orthogonality condition between excess returns in domestic currency and the di⁄erence
in the stochastic discount factors evaluated in the same currency. Since expected excess returns are
8zero up to a ￿rst-order approximation, ie Et [^ rx;t+1] = 0 + O("2); this condition can be expressed
as:
Covt(^  t+1 ￿ ^  
￿
t+1 + ￿ ^ Qt+1; ^ rx;t+1) = 0 + O("2) (13)
As shown by Devereux and Sutherland (2008a), to evaluate (13) and determine the portfolio
shares, it is su¢ cient to take a ￿rst-order approximation of the remaining equilibrium conditions for
which the only aspect of portfolio behaviour that matter is the steady-state foreign bond portfolio,
￿ ￿:
3 Optimal Foreign Currency Position and Valuation E⁄ects
In this section we derive the optimal foreign currency portfolio position and valuation e⁄ects of
a monetary expansion under di⁄erent assumptions as to how monetary policy is conducted. To
understand the hedging motives of investors in our economy we ￿rst derive a partial equilibrium
expression for their foreign bond position. We then analyse the determinants of the portfolio
orthogonality condition under the di⁄erent policy regimes. This allows us to understand the in-
vestors￿optimal portfolio allocation. Finally, a full general equilibrium solution to these portfolios
is derived.12
3.1 Partial equilibrium analysis of foreign currency position
Investors in our model can choose to hold both domestic as well as foreign currency denominated
nominal bonds. In what follows, we will show that this portfolio choice depends on the hedging
characteristics of both types of bonds. Following Benigno and Nistico (2009), we derive a partial
equilibrium solution for foreign bond holdings. Speci￿cally, we use the ￿rst-order approximation to
the model equations to evaluate the portfolio orthogonality condition coming from the second-order
approximation to the portfolio choice equations.
Using the de￿nition of stochastic discount factors, equation (13) can be written in terms of









= 0 + O("2) (14)




as a function of prices, relative endowments and excess returns on the steady-state foreign bond
12Throughout this section we set ￿ = 0; and use the standard constant discount factor rather than Uzawa preferences
to characterise analytical solutions.
9portfolio using the equations for the accumulation of net foreign assets and the combined Euler
equations.
As shown in the appendix, we can write the relative net foreign asset ( \ NFAR









t￿1 + 2~ ￿^ rx;t + ^ Y R
t ￿ ^ CR
t + ^ Qt (15)
where ~ ￿ = ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ Y is the steady-state foreign bond portfolio of home agents normalised by income,
^ rx;t ￿ ^ rF;t ￿ ^ rH;t is the excess return on foreign bonds expressed in home currency, ^ Y R
t ￿ ^ PH;t +
^ YH;t ￿ ( ^ P￿
F;t + ^ St + ^ Y ￿
F;t) is the relative non-￿nancial income measured in domestic currency.
We combine the domestic and foreign Euler equations to get:
Et ^ CR





Et ^ Qt+1 ￿ ^ Qt
￿
(16)
The appendix shows that solving equations (15) and (16) forward for NF ^ AR
t and ^ CR
t ; we can

































Now de￿ne ￿Y;t+1 as the ￿ news at time t+1￿about relative non-￿nancial income. That is, ￿Y;t+1









t+1+j. Similarly, we de￿ne ￿Q;t+1 as ￿ news at time t+1￿
about the future value of real exchange rates, ie ￿Q;t+1 ￿ Et+1
1 X
j=0




Using equations (17) and (14) we can derive an expression for the foreign currency portfolio, ~ ￿ :
















Equation (18) shows that the foreign currency portfolio, ~ ￿, depends on two covariance-variance
ratios, which represent the two risks that agents want to hedge against irrespective of the special
characteristics of the model: the relative non-￿nancial income risk given by ￿Y;t+1 and the real
10exchange rate risk given by ￿Q;t+1: As put forth by Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009) and Benigno
and Nistico (2009), these covariance-variance ratios can be interpreted as asset return loadings on
risk - the regression coe¢ cient when you regress risk on excess return.
The excess return on foreign bonds relative to home bonds is given by surprises in home currency
depreciation as the UIP holds in a ￿rst-order approximation to the model:
^ rx;t+1 = ^ St+1 ￿ Et ^ St+1 (19)
Then, according to (18) and (19), it is optimal to take a long position in foreign currency (ie
~ ￿ > 0) if the home currency depreciates in periods when non-￿nancial income is lower at home
than abroad, ie Covt(￿Y;t+1;rx;t+1) < 0 and/or when home consumption basket is more expensive,
ie Covt(￿Q;t+1;rx;t+1) < 0. In other words, domestic investors would prefer to hold foreign over
domestic bonds if foreign bonds yield an excess return (foreign currency appreciates) in periods
when domestic income is relatively low or when the domestic consumption basket rises in price
relative to the foreign (a domestic real appreciation).13 This in turn, would depend crucially on the
monetary policy regime as we illustrate in the general equilibrium solution below.
3.2 General equilibrium solution for optimal foreign currency position
It is possible to characterise closed-form solutions for optimal foreign bond portfolios given the
relatively simple structure of our model.14 Since optimal portfolios are pinned down by the port-




￿ and ^ rx;t+1 (or ^ St+1) to understand the equilibrium foreign currency position.
First, we consider the solution for the real exchange rate adjusted consumption di⁄erential. We
rewrite equation (17) as a function of the structural shocks and the excess return on foreign bond






2￿(￿￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿(1 + 2￿(￿ ￿ 1))
("Y;t+1 ￿ "Y ￿;t+1) (20)
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + 4￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 + 2￿(￿ ￿ 1))
~ ￿^ rx;t+1
13Note that under log utility (￿ = 1) there is no real exchange rate hedging motive but investors are still facing
relative non-￿nancial income risk. This is also true if real exchange rate is constant, which corresponds to ￿ = 0:5 in
our model.
14Even in this simple endowment economy the expressions are quite complicated. Thus, for ease of exposition, we
set the persistence of endowment shocks to 1 in this section.
15Note that we ignore other state variables in the solution as they do not matter when evaluating the conditional
covariance given in equation 14.
11Equation (20) shows that if agents did not have any foreign currency position, that is ~ ￿ = 0, the
real exchange rate adjusted relative consumption would depend only on the relative supply shock.
This is because, without valuation e⁄ects coming from movements in the exchange rate, monetary
policy has no e⁄ect on real variables under ￿ exible prices. So, if agents were only faced with
monetary policy shocks, the optimal portfolio would imply having no foreign currency position, as
this ensures perfect smoothing in the adjusted relative consumption. But equation (20) also shows
that the zero-portfolio position, ie ~ ￿ = 0; would not insure agents against endowment shocks. So
the relative importance of the di⁄erent shocks will pin down how far from the zero portfolio agents
will choose to be.
3.2.1 Money-growth rule
Consider now that the central bank follows a money-growth rule, as speci￿ed in Section 2.2. Taking
the di⁄erence of money demand equations in each country yields:
^ MR
t = ￿ ^ CR
t ￿
￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
( ^ RH;t+1 ￿ ^ R￿
F;t+1) + ^ Pt ￿ ^ P￿
t (21)
where ^ MR
t = ^ Mt ￿ ^ M￿
t : Substituting (19) into (21) it is possible to express the nominal exchange
rate as a function of relative money supplies and consumption di⁄erential adjusted by the real
exchange rate:
1
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
(^ St ￿ ￿ ￿Et ^ St+1) = ^ MR





Note that under complete markets where ^ Ct￿ ^ C￿
t =
^ Qt
￿ ; the nominal exchange rate only depends
on relative money supplies. But in our incomplete markets setting, solving equation (22) forward

















Equation (23) shows that for a given level of relative money supply growth, the domestic cur-
rency depreciates when the economy is hit by adverse real shocks that decrease relative consumption
(adjusted by the real exchange rate). The intuition is that an adverse domestic real shock implies
a decline in the demand for money. Given a ￿xed supply of money, domestic interest rates fall
relative to foreign which - via the UIP condition - would entail a domestic currency depreciation.
Hence, this partial equilibrium equation already illustrates how assuming a money-growth rule im-
plies that the domestic currency will be negatively correlated with relative consumption in the face
of real shocks. It, thus, suggests that a long position in foreign currency would help investors hedge
12against such shocks.
In fact, the general equilibrium solution for excess returns in terms of the shocks and steady-
state portfolio is given by the following expression:




(2￿(￿￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1))
1 + 2￿(￿ ￿ 1)






~ ￿mg(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + 4￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + 2￿(￿ ￿ 1))
￿￿1
If agents did not have any foreign bond holdings, ie ~ ￿mg = 0; a fall in relative home endowment
would lead to a nominal exchange rate depreciation. At the same time, equation (20) demonstrates
that, in the presence of home bias and when goods are substitutes in the utility (ie v > 1=2 and
￿￿ > 1),16 a fall in relative home endowment decreases relative home consumption. This suggests
that agents would want to have a long position in foreign bonds, ie have ~ ￿mg > 0; to hedge against
relative endowment shocks.
But if ~ ￿mg 6= 0, relative consumption is also subject to relative money supply shocks. However,
regardless of the sign of the foreign currency position, relative consumption and excess returns
will be positively correlated ( ^ CR
t+1 ￿
^ Qt+1
￿ depends positively on ~ ￿mg^ rx;t+1 as shown in equation
(20)). Hence, the presence of monetary shocks limits the size of the bond portfolio, but it does not
in￿ uence the sign.
Using equations (20) and (24) in the second-order portfolio orthogonality condition (14), we get
the following analytical expression for steady-state foreign bond holdings under the money-growth
rule:
~ ￿mg =
(1 ￿ ￿)(2￿(￿￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1))2






Equation (25) con￿rms that, under the money-growth rule, it is optimal to have a long position
in foreign bonds (regardless of the value of structural parameters). The expression above also
con￿rms that the size of the bond position decreases as the relative variance of monetary shocks
increases.
3.2.2 In￿ ation-targeting Taylor rule
Consider next the case where monetary policy is characterised by a Taylor rule that only responds to
movements in in￿ ation. We can derive the relative stance of monetary policies in the two countries
16The presence of home bias and substitute goods is a su¢ cient condition. The necessary condition is 2￿(￿￿￿1) >
(￿ ￿ 1).
13by taking the di⁄erence of the linearised Taylor rules:
^ RH;t+1 ￿ ^ R￿
F;t+1 = ￿￿( ^ Pt ￿ ^ Pt￿1) ￿ ￿￿( ^ P￿
t ￿ ^ P￿
t￿1) + "R;t ￿ "R￿;t
Substituting the condition for excess returns (19) we get:
￿(^ St ￿ Et ^ St+1) = ￿￿(^ ￿t ￿ ^ ￿￿
t) + "R;t ￿ "R￿;t (26)
Equation (26) shows that the domestic currency appreciates when domestic in￿ ation increases
relative to foreign. The intuition is that higher in￿ ation at home requires the domestic central bank
to raise interest rates which would trigger a domestic nominal appreciation. In the words of Clarida
and Waldman (2007), any bad news about in￿ ation is ￿ good news for the exchange rate￿ . Note that,
in our model, for most parameter values, a decline in relative domestic endowment is associated with
an increase in domestic in￿ ation. Hence, assuming a Taylor rule implies that adverse endowment
shocks are associated with both a nominal appreciation of the domestic currency and a decline in
the excess return on foreign bonds (^ rx;t+1). This suggests that foreign currency denominated bonds
are a poor hedge in the face of endowment shocks.
To demonstrate this point formally, and derive an analytical expression for the optimal portfolio,
we obtain a general equilibrium solution for excess returns:
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~ ￿tr(1 ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ 1)2)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + 2￿(￿ ￿ 1))
￿￿1
Let us consider the zero-portfolio solution (ie ~ ￿tr = 0) in a speci￿cation of the model that
features consumption home bias and assumes that domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in
the utility. In this case, a negative relative endowment shock at home leads to a unexpected
appreciation in the home currency. And, as shown in equation (20), this shock also decreases
relative consumption. So, in the face of such shocks, agents would want to hold a short position in
foreign bonds, ie ~ ￿tr < 0:
However, for ~ ￿tr 6= 0; monetary shocks a⁄ect consumption through the valuation channel. But
again, as illustrated by (20) and (27), this relative consumption risk cannot be diversi￿ed away
(that is, relative consumption and excess returns move in the same direction in response to relative
monetary shocks for any value of e ￿tr 6= 0).
Evaluating equations (14), (20) and (27) we can obtain an analytical expression for steady-state
14foreign bond holdings under the Taylor rule:
~ ￿tr = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ 1)(2￿(￿￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + 2￿(￿ ￿ 1))
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i (28)
This shows that for ￿ > 1
2 and ￿￿ > 1; it is optimal to have a short position in foreign bonds
under the Taylor rule. As with a money-growth rule, the size of the bond portfolio decreases as
the relative variance of monetary shocks increases. Also, the bigger the response to in￿ ation in the
Taylor rule, the bigger the size of the bond portfolio. This is because with a stronger response to
in￿ ation the monetary authority o⁄sets the e⁄ect of monetary shocks on excess returns (as shown
in equation (27) and pointed out by Devereux and Sutherland (2008b)).
As illustrated above and emphasised by Benigno and Benigno (2008) and Clarida and Waldman
(2007), di⁄erent monetary regimes change the cyclical properties of the exchange rate. Moreover,
these di⁄erent cyclical properties of the exchange rate will determine the hedging characteristic of
domestic over foreign bonds - that is, whether the domestic currency depreciates or appreciates in
periods of low domestic income determines whether investors take a long or a short position in the
foreign currency. Therefore, the agents￿optimal portfolio position crucially depends on the choice
of policy rule.
3.3 Valuation e⁄ects of monetary policy
Having demonstrated how di⁄erent monetary policy rules a⁄ect the optimal currency positions, we
now turn to the international transmission of monetary shocks. In our set-up, monetary policy
shocks generate endogenous currency movements. Since agents hold a portfolio of both foreign
and domestic-currency denominated bonds, any shifts in the nominal exchange rate will trigger
international valuation e⁄ects. As de￿ned below, these valuation e⁄ects depend on the excess
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￿








To see how the valuation e⁄ect changes across monetary policy regimes, we use the expressions
for excess returns (24) and (27) to obtain:
V AL
mg
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where ~ ￿mg and ~ ￿tr are given by (25) and (28), respectively.
In our model, an exogenous domestic monetary expansion always depreciates the domestic
currency.17 Given that ^ rx;t = ^ St ￿ Et￿1 ^ St, this shock increases the excess return on the foreign
bond. If domestic investors are long in foreign currency, as is the case under the money-growth
rule (ie ~ ￿mg > 0), then this domestic monetary expansion will give rise to a positive valuation
e⁄ect in the domestic economy as shown by equation (30). Therefore, monetary policy will be
beggar-thy-neighbour. In contrast, if the same investors are short in foreign currency, as is the case
under the Taylor rule (ie ~ ￿tr < 0); monetary policy will be beggar-thy-self.18
Although in this paper we are mainly interested in the valuation e⁄ects implied by monetary
policy shocks, it is worth noting that supply shocks also create portfolio valuation e⁄ects through
their e⁄ect on the nominal exchange rate as shown in (30) and (31). Whether a positive supply
shock at home implies positive or negative valuation e⁄ect would also depend on monetary policy
regime.
4 Numerical Results and Robustness Checks
The previous section provided some analytical results for the foreign currency portfolios and the
valuation e⁄ects of monetary policy. In this section, we present numerical results for our model,
and discuss how the valuation channel of monetary policy works under ￿ exible prices using impulse
response functions. We look at the sensitivity of these results to di⁄erent values of shock persistence,
relative variance and monetary policy stance. We then provide more robustness checks by allowing
for trade in equities in addition to bonds in the ￿ exible price model and by considering a sticky
price model with trade in nominal bonds. When prices are sticky we also allow for a more general
speci￿cation of the Taylor rule.
4.1 Numerical solution of the ￿ exible price model
In this section, we calculate the optimal steady-state portfolio holdings numerically and analyse
the model up to a ￿rst-order approximation around that particular steady-state. We compare the
17Note that a relative monetary expansion is an increase in relative money supplies ("M;t+1 ￿ "M￿;t+1 > 0) under
the money-growth rule, and a fall in relative nominal interest rates ("R;t+1 ￿ "R￿;t+1 < 0) under the Taylor rule.
18Under the conditions for which ~ ￿tr < 0; namely for v >
1
2 and ￿￿ > 1; V AL
tr
t < 0 in a home monetary expansion









16simulations from the case of a money-growth rule with that for the Taylor rule. While the analytical
results in the previous section explained how portfolio choice a⁄ects the international transmission
of monetary shocks, the aim of the simulation results in this section is to quantify the importance
of the international valuation e⁄ects.
The calibration parameters are summarised in the top panel in Table 1 while the bottom panel
contains the steady-state portfolio shares and percentage change in net foreign asset position implied
by a 1% exchange rate depreciation for the case of a money-growth rule as well as for the Taylor-rule
case.
Table 1: Baseline calibration and steady-state foreign bond position
Parameter Description Money-Growth Rule Taylor Rule
￿ ￿ = ! ￿ C
￿￿ Steady-state discount factor 0.99 0.99
￿ Uzawa convergence parameter 0.01 0.01
￿ CRRA 2 2
￿ Elas. of subs. across dom. and foreign goods 2.5 2.5
￿ Preference for domestic goods in consumption 0.72 0.72
￿Y Persistence of endowment shocks 0.96 0.96
￿M Persistence of monetary shocks 0 0




m Relative size of endow. shocks wrt mon. shocks 1 1
￿ ￿=￿ ￿ ￿ Y Steady-state foreign bond position rel. to GDP 2.0297 -1.4103
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ Y ^ rx;t Valuation e⁄ect of 1% nominal exch. rate dep. 2% of GDP -1.4% of GDP
The calibration parameters are fairly standard. The steady-state discount factor, ￿, equals
0:99 while the Uzawa convergence parameter equals 0:01 which is similar to Devereux and Yetman
(2009). The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), ￿, equals 2 and the elasticity of substitu-
tion across domestic and foreign goods;￿, equals 2:5. This is slightly higher than the values chosen
by Heathcote and Perri (2002) but below that typically chosen in the New Open Economy Macro-
economics literature (see for instance de Paoli (2009)). The home bias in consumption parameter;
￿, is equal to 0:74 which implies an import share of 26%. The persistence of endowment process,
￿Y , is set equal to 0:96 while monetary shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. Our benchmark calibration
presumes that the volatility of monetary shocks is similar to that of real shocks but our sensitivity
analysis considers the case where real shocks are more volatile than monetary shocks.
4.1.1 Monetary shocks and a money-growth rule
Under a money-growth rule, we calculate that the steady-state foreign bond position relative to
GDP is 203%. Hence, agents ￿nd it optimal to go short in their home currency (and long in the
foreign currency). This is consistent with the analytical results in Section 3.2.1. With a money-
17growth rule, agents realise that adverse real shocks (which lower their income and consumption)
are associated with a foreign currency appreciation and hence a positive excess return from holding
foreign currency denominated bonds.
Figure 1 illustrates the e⁄ects of a positive domestic monetary shock when monetary policy
is conducted via a money-growth rule. On impact, the domestic currency depreciates in nominal
terms. Given that domestic investors are long in foreign currency denominated bonds, the endoge-
nous currency movement generates an increase in the domestic currency value of the country￿ s net
foreign asset (NFA) position (shown as a 1.7% jump in the NFA position in Figure 1). This valu-
ation e⁄ect allows domestic consumers to increase their consumption. Since part of the domestic
consumption is imported, the domestic currency has to appreciate in real terms to satisfy the higher
demand for imported consumption. This adjustment in real exchange rates comes about via higher
domestic prices.
Thus, because agents are long in foreign bonds, monetary policy shocks trigger international
valuation e⁄ects that are beggar-thy-neighbour. While the e⁄ects are quantitatively fairly small (a
1.7% rise in net external wealth is associated with a 0.03% increase in consumption), the size of
these are roughly in line with the estimates of wealth e⁄ects on consumption found in the empirical
literature (see Labhard et al (2005) and Fair (2004)).
4.1.2 Monetary shocks and an in￿ ation-targeting Taylor rule
We now turn to the case when monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule. Here the
steady-state foreign bond position to GDP is calculated to be -141% which implies that agents
want to go short in foreign currency (and long in domestic currency). This is because adverse real
shocks which lower consumption are now associated with a foreign currency depreciation and hence
a negative excess return from holding foreign currency denominated bonds. So agents prefer to
hold domestic bonds over foreign bonds. Figure 2 illustrates the valuation e⁄ects from a positive
domestic monetary policy shock when the central bank follows a Taylor rule. We assume this is an
exogenous shock to the domestic Taylor rule function (ie a rise in "R;t) where the size of the shock
is standardised to give a one standard deviation increase in domestic money growth. This shock
implies a jump in the nominal exchange rate. Since agents hold a portfolio that is short in foreign
currency denominated bonds, this nominal appreciation of the foreign currency causes a decline in
the domestic net foreign wealth (measured in domestic currency). The loss in wealth triggers a
decline in domestic consumption and as a result an excess supply of domestic goods. The domestic
currency has to depreciate in real terms to ensure that this excess supply is eliminated.
In contrast to our previous experiment, monetary policy shocks with a Taylor rule cause in-
ternational valuation e⁄ects that are beggar-thy-self. Agents have chosen a portfolio position to
optimally hedge themselves against the consumption risks caused by real shocks. So in the case of
18the Taylor rule, agents prefer to hold a positive position in domestic bonds and a negative posi-
tion in foreign bonds. The side-e⁄ect of having these optimally chosen portfolios is that monetary
shocks can cause negative valuation e⁄ects. As in the case with money-growth rules, the size of
these wealth e⁄ects are quantitatively small (a 1.46% fall in wealth is associated with a 0.02%
decline in consumption).
4.1.3 Sensitivity analysis
This section ￿rst examines the sensitivity of our results using the model where monetary policy is
conducted via a Taylor rule where the central bank targets in￿ ation. As previously shown, with an
in￿ ation-targeting Taylor rule investors will choose an optimal portfolio that is overweight in home
bonds.
Varying the shock persistence
Baxter and Crucini (1995) have shown how more persistent shocks in an incomplete markets
model imply greater changes in relative wealth across countries. The ￿rst panel in Figure 3 shows
the e⁄ects of a 1% domestic monetary expansion (1% fall in home policy rates) on the steady-state
foreign bond position, the impact response on the nominal exchange rate as well as on domestic
consumption for di⁄erent degrees of shock persistence. The ￿gures show that making the endow-
ment shocks more persistent exposes agents to larger exchange rate movements and thus more risk
- which they want to hedge against by holding a larger gross portfolio position. A higher gross
portfolio position ampli￿es the valuation e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks. As illustrated in Figure
3, domestic consumption declines by more (on impact) following a domestic monetary expansion,
the more persistent the endowment process.
Varying the relative variance of real shocks
Agents in our model choose a portfolio to hedge themselves against the consumption risk caused
by real shocks. As equation 28 shows, the size of the bond portfolio increases as the relative variance
of real shocks increases. This analytical result is con￿rmed by the second panel in Figure 3. When
real shocks are assumed to be ten times more volatile than monetary shocks, agents will choose a
steady-state foreign bond position relative to GDP equal to minus 10! In other words, investors
will signi￿cantly short foreign bonds and go long in domestic bonds. Again, a higher gross portfolio
position increases the potency of monetary shocks. This implies a greater nominal depreciation
in the domestic currency (on impact), triggering greater valuation e⁄ects and a larger decline (on
impact) in domestic consumption (as shown in the second panel in Figure 3).
Varying the weight of in￿ation in the Taylor rule
The implication of a larger Taylor rule response to in￿ ation (ie a larger ￿￿) for the valuation
e⁄ect of monetary shocks is twofold: First, the higher ￿￿ the smaller is the e⁄ect of the money shock
on in￿ ation and the exchange rate. But this increases the importance of real shocks relative to
19monetary shocks. So this increases the investors￿hedging motives and thus the size of their portfolio
positions. The ￿rst e⁄ect - the smaller exchange rate response - would diminish the valuation e⁄ect
of monetary shocks. But the second e⁄ect - the increase in portfolio position - would amplify it.
As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3 for values of ￿￿ between 0 and 20, the second e⁄ect
dominates. But for larger values of ￿￿ the endogenous monetary policy response completely o⁄sets
the e⁄ects of monetary shocks. This is consistent with Devereux and Sutherland (2008b), who show
that the central bank can complete the markets and ensure full risk-sharing by pursuing a price
stability objective.
4.2 Trade in equities in the ￿ exible price model
In this part, we allow for international trade in equities as well as bonds and show that the main
implication of our model about the link between monetary policy and foreign currency positions is
robust provided that we continue to have incomplete markets. As shown by Engel and Matsumoto
(2009) and Devereux and Sutherland (2008b), monetary policy does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on equilibrium portfolios under complete markets. If there are only supply shocks and monetary
shocks in each country, allowing for trade in equities in addition to bonds will complete the markets.
In this case, the optimal bond position becomes zero irrespective of the monetary policy regime.
This is because real shocks will be hedged by equities whose returns are not a⁄ected by nominal
shocks under ￿ exible prices, unlike nominal bonds. Then, having a zero bond portfolio will insulate
the economy from monetary shocks. However, the optimal equity portfolio in this case will exhibit
a foreign bias: when output is higher at home, the home consumption basket becomes cheaper (real
exchange rate depreciates), while the returns on home equity relative to foreign goes up because of
the increase in output (dividend).
We know from the existing literature on general equilibrium portfolio models that one possible
way to derive home bias in equity is to have a negative correlation between relative non-￿nancial
income and relative home equity returns.19 Thus, when we allow for trade in equities, we assume
that only a part of total endowment in each country can be diversi￿ed away by holding equities.
This part of the income is generally referred to as ￿nancial income (or capital income) in the
literature. The rest of the income, which is not subject to equity returns, is the non-￿nancial
income, which can be thought of as labour income in a production economy. We allow for both
capital income and non-￿nancial income to be stochastic as in Devereux and Sutherland (2010).
These shocks work as the redistributive shocks introduced by Coeurdacier et al (2007).
19See Heathcote and Perri (2007), Coeurdacier et al (2007), Engel and Matsumoto (2009), Coeurdacier et al (2010)
and the references in these papers.
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where ￿ ￿F is the steady-state foreign currency (bond) portfolio as before and ￿ ￿E
F is the steady-state
foreign equity holdings:20 ^ rF;t￿^ rH;t is the excess return on foreign bonds relative to home bonds as
before while ^ rE
F;t￿^ rE
H;t gives the excess return on foreign equities relative to home equities expressed
in terms of home good. Another key di⁄erence here relative to the model with only bonds is that
Yt = YK;t+YL;t and Y ￿
t = Y ￿
K;t+Y ￿
L;t, where YK and YL represent ￿nancial and non-￿nancial incomes
as explained above.21 The stochastic processes for YK and YL are speci￿ed as in Devereux and
Sutherland (2010). A similar structure exists for the foreign country with symmetric parameters.
logYK;t = (1 ￿ ￿K)log ￿ YK + ￿KYK;t￿1 + "K;t; Et￿1["K;t] = 0;V ar["K;t] = ￿2
K; Cov["K;"L] = ￿KL
logYL;t = (1 ￿ ￿L)log ￿ YL + ￿LYL;t￿1 + "L;t; Et￿1["L;t] = 0; V ar["L;t] = ￿2
L
How does international trade in equities a⁄ect optimal bond positions within this framework? When
equity trade is allowed, nominal bonds hedge the part of the risk that is not hedged by equities.
Thus, what matters for the bond portfolio in this case is the conditional covariance-variance ratios.
The partial equilibrium solution for foreign bond position presented earlier in the paper, in equation
(18), changes in the following way:
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where ￿YL;t+1 is the news at time t + 1 about the net present value of the relative non-￿nancial
income and ￿Q;t+1 is the news at time t + 1 about the net present value of real exchange rates as
before. As shown in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), non-￿nancial income risk will be mainly
hedged by equities, while nominal bonds will be used to hedge against the real exchange rate risk
since real exchange rates are correlated more with relative bond returns than with relative equity
returns. Thus, there will still be a role for nominal assets in providing consumption risk-sharing
across countries in the presence of equities provided that equities do not complete the markets.
What is more, the sign of the conditional covariance-variance ratios given in equation (33) will still
be determined by the monetary policy regime in the same way as in the bonds only case. On the
20Here, equity holdings are de￿ned as gross real holdings, not as shares of total equity stock but it is possible
to express these gross positions as shares of stock as we do later when reporting numerical results. We use the
assumption that all assets are in net zero supply when writing equation 32.
21Note that YK is what is paid out every period by domestic equity (dividend). In the model without equities, all
endowment is non-￿nancial income because bonds do not represent any claims on income, ie YK;t = 0 and Yt = YL;t:
21other hand, equity portfolios will not be a⁄ected by monetary policy much. The important factors
in determining optimal equity portfolio are the share of capital income and the correlation between
￿nancial and non-￿nancial incomes. In Table 2, we give some numerical results regarding the model
with equities. We only report the calibration for the new parameters, the calibration for the rest
of model parameters is the same as in Table 1.
Table 2: Steady-state foreign bond position and domestic equity shares when there is trade in
bonds and equities
Parameter Description Money-Growth Rule Taylor Rule
￿K Persistence of ￿nancial income shocks 0.96 0.96
￿L Persistence of non-￿nancial income shocks 0.96 0.96




M Rel. size of ￿nancial income wrt mon. shocks 2 2
￿2
L=￿2
K Rel. size of ￿n. income wrt non-￿n. income shocks 1 1
Corr("K;"L) Correlation of ￿n. and non-￿n. income shocks -0.2 -0.2
￿ xH Steady-state share of dom. stock held by home agents 0.9056 0.9091
￿ ￿F=￿ ￿ ￿ Y Steady-state foreign bond position rel. to GDP 1.8067 -1.2611
￿ ￿F
￿ ￿ ￿ Y ^ rx;t Valuation e⁄ect of 1% unexpected nom. exch. rate dep. 1.8% of GDP -1.3% of GDP
Our calibration for the parameters that determine the stochastic properties of capital and
labour income shocks follow closely that of Devereux and Sutherland (2010). Accordingly, we set
the steady-state ￿nancial income share equal to 0.36 and the correlation between ￿nancial and
non-￿nancial income shocks to -0.2, which is a less negative number than is required to derive
equity home bias in a one-good model without bonds. We take the relative variance of ￿nancial
and non-￿nancial income shocks to be equal, while we lower the size of monetary policy shocks
relative to income shocks to get bond positions closer in size to the bond positions we obtain under
the bonds only case.22
With the calibration in Table 2, we get that 90% of domestic equity is held by home agents,
which is in line with the observed home equity bias. Note that the equity portfolio is independent
of the monetary policy rule as expected. On the other hand, the sign of bond portfolios continue
to depend crucially on the policy rule, even when relative bond returns are conditioned on relative
equity returns. When bond portfolios are mainly hedging against real exchange rate appreciations,
a negative relative non-￿nancial income shock that appreciates the real exchange rate will require
a long position in foreign bonds if the home currency depreciates in response to the negative non-
￿nancial income shock as is the case under a passive monetary policy regime. Vice versa is true for
the in￿ ation-targeting Taylor rule. These results justify analysing only bonds to study international
22When monetary shocks are the same size as (capital) income shocks, steady￿ state foreign bond positions are
-0.6411 under Taylor rule and 0.9016 under money-growth rule.
22valuation e⁄ects created by monetary policy.
With trade in equities, there will also be valuation e⁄ects coming from the capital gains and
losses on equity positions. Taking the di⁄erence in net foreign assets using equation (32) and
decomposing it into current account and valuation terms as we did before in equation (29), we can
de￿ne the valuation e⁄ect with trade in equities as follows:
V ALt =
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where the ￿rst term is what we analyse as valuation e⁄ects throughout the paper. Using the
de￿nitions of bond and equity returns and the property that expected excess returns are zero in a
￿rst order approximation, we can further write this as follows:
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where TOT is the terms of trade de￿ned as the price of imports relative to exports, Y R
K;t is the
di⁄erence between home and foreign capital incomes and ZH and Z￿
F are the real prices of home
and foreign equity de￿ned in terms of home and foreign goods, respectively.
The ￿rst important point is that relative equity returns only depend on real variables like the
terms of trade, relative income and relative equity prices as shown in (34). Thus, even though
we are operating under incomplete markets and monetary policy shocks have real e⁄ects through
home bond portfolios, the e⁄ect of monetary policy shocks on ^ rE
F;t ￿ ^ rE
H;t is negligible. Thus, in our
￿ exible price set-up, a currency depreciation caused by a monetary policy expansion a⁄ects V ALt
mainly through relative bond returns, which is what we have analysed so far in the paper.
4.3 Sticky prices
Our analysis so far only considers fully ￿ exible prices. A natural question that comes to mind is
whether our results on the link between policy regimes and foreign bond positions, and consequently
on the valuation channel of monetary policy, would go through in a sticky price environment. To
answer this question, we introduce price rigidities in the model with only bonds and show that the
sign of the foreign currency portfolio continues to be a⁄ected in a similar way as in the ￿ exible
price model for reasonable calibrations of the model.
Optimal portfolios under sticky prices have been analysed before in Devereux and Sutherland
(2008b) and Engel and Matsumoto (2009). In a model where monetary policy is speci￿ed as a
23Taylor rule that reacts to PPI in￿ ation, Devereux and Sutherland (2008b) ￿nd a negative position
in foreign bonds under incomplete markets. The main di⁄erence of our model with Devereux and
Sutherland (2008b) is that we analyse portfolios under ￿ passive￿monetary policy regimes as well
as in￿ ation targeting regimes and show how the optimal foreign bond portfolio might switch sign
depending on this classi￿cation in an incomplete market setting. Engel and Matsumoto (2009),
on the other hand, assume a money-growth rule for monetary policy and show that the optimal
foreign curreny position will be negative whether or not money supplies are allowed to respond
to productivity shocks under a complete market setting where there is also trade in equities.23
Therefore, market incompleteness is crucial for our result on the link between policy and portfolio
currency shares under sticky prices.
The basic features of the model are as follows: Price stickiness is modelled ￿ la Calvo. In
each period, a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1) of randomly selected ￿rms in each country cannot change their
prices. The remaining 1 ￿ ￿ fraction of ￿rms chooses prices optimally to maximise the expected
discounted value of future pro￿ts. Each ￿rm produces a single variety of the domestic consumption
good according to a production function that is linear in labour, ie Yt = AtLt for the home country,
where At is an AR(1) productivity shock common across all home ￿rms. A similar production
function and productivity shock exist for the foreign country. The representative agent in each
country now also gets disutility from work as well as utility from consumption and real money
holdings. The model is otherwise similar to the model presented in Section 2. We present the
important equations of the sticky price model in the appendix.
We know from the literature that the currency in which export prices are set is crucial for
the international tranmission of monetary shocks under sticky prices.24 Therefore, we consider
two di⁄erent price-setting assumptions for exports: producer currency pricing (PCP) and local
currency pricing (LCP). Under PCP, producers in each country set export prices in their own
currency, whereas under LCP, export prices are set in the currency of the buyer.25 When prices
are set according to LCP, the law of one price no longer holds. In this case, real exchange rate
￿ uctuations re￿ ect both the presence of home bias in consumption and deviations from the law of
one price.
We solve the model numerically to analyse the interaction between policy regimes and bond
portfolios under sticky prices. We use the same parameter values as in the ￿ exible price model
given in Table 1, where applicable. The rest of the model parameters are calibrated as follows. The
23The intuition in Engel and Matsumoto is as follows: due to price stickiness, home labour income and relative
returns on home equity are negatively correlated for a given exchange rate. Thus, it is optimal to have home bias in
equity. When exchange rate depreciates, home revenues increase in home currency terms. Given that equity portfolios
are home biased, this leads to an increase in relative consumption which can be hedged by having a short position in
foreign currency.
24See for example Betts and Devereux (2000, 2001), Devereux and Engel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
25Optimal price for each case is given in the appendix.
24elasticity of substitution across varieties in each country, ￿; is set to 10, which is consistent with a
price mark-up of 11%. The price stickiness parameter ￿ equals 0:75, so that prices are set for a year
at a time. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, $; is set to 2￿the same value as
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The persistence of the productivity shock in each country,
￿A; equals 0:96; the same value as the persistence of the endowment process in the ￿ exible price
model. Monetary shocks are assumed to be i.i.d as before. Our benchmark calibration presumes
that the volatility of monetary shocks is equal to that of real shocks but we also report the results
for di⁄erent values of relative variance.
Table 3: Steady-state foreign bond position and implied valuation e⁄ects under the baseline cali-
bration
Money-Growth Rule Taylor Rule
￿ ￿=￿ ￿ ￿ Y Flex PCP LCP Flex PCP LCP
￿A=￿M= 1 1.9821 1.0327 2.0037 -1.9014 -2.0975 -1.3250
￿A=￿M= 0:5 0.9890 0.1317 1.1104 -0.9743 -1.3870 -0.6490
￿A=￿M= 0:1 0.1975 -0.5867 0.3982 -0.1988 -0.8003 -0.0885
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ Y ^ rx;t
￿A=￿M= 1 2% of GDP 1% of GDP 2% of GDP -1.9% of GDP -2.1% of GDP -1.3% of GDP
￿ ￿=￿ ￿ ￿ Y is steady-state foreign bond position rel. to GDP and ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ Y ^ rx;t gives the valuation e⁄ect of 1% nominal exch. rate dep.
Table 3 gives home country￿ s optimal steady-state foreign bond holdings in proportion to GDP
for two di⁄erent policy regimes and three di⁄erent price-setting assumptions under the benchmark
calibration described above.26 We see that the link between monetary policy regimes and foreign
bond portfolios under sticky prices is similar to that under ￿ exible prices. That is, money-growth
targeting is associated with a long position in foreign bonds, while the opposite is true for strict
in￿ ation targeting irrespective of the currency in which export prices are set. To understand
the portfolio positions given in Table 3 and explain the di⁄erences across di⁄erent policy regimes
and price-setting assumptions, we look at the covariance of real exchange rate adjusted relative
consumption and excess returns conditional on relative supply shocks and monetary shocks under
the zero-portfolio solution (ignoring the valuation e⁄ects). Table 4 shows how each component of
the portfolio orthogonality condition given in equation (13) responds to these shocks under the
benchmark calibration.
First of all, just as in the case of ￿ exible prices, the covariance of real exchange rate adjusted
relative consumption, ^ CR
t ￿ ^ Qt=￿, and excess returns, ^ rx;t = ^ St ￿ Et￿1 ^ St; conditional on relative
productivity shock is negative under money-growth rule and positive under in￿ ation-targeting Tay-
26We obtain the ￿ exible price solution by letting ￿ ! 0. Note that the ￿ exible price solution for this model is
di⁄erent than the one for the endowment model, because here labour supply is elastic. As $ ! 1; labour supply
becomes in￿nitely inelastic and the model collapses to the endowment economy case.
25Table 4: Conditional covariance of real exchange rate adjusted relative consumption and excess
returns under zero-portfolio solution
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lor rule - irrespective of the price-setting assumption. Indeed, whether export prices are set in
producer￿ s or buyer￿ s currency does not a⁄ect relative consumption and excess returns signi￿cantly
in the face of productivity shocks.27 Thus, hedging against the relative consumption risk coming
from productivity shocks requires a long position in foreign currency under money-growth rule and
a short position under strict in￿ ation targeting just as in the case of ￿ exible prices. The di⁄erence
in the sign of the covariance across policy regimes comes from the di⁄erent response of nominal
exchange rates. The intuition for this result is as described in Section 2.
The most important implication of sticky prices for bond positions is that now agents use
bonds also to hedge against the relative consumption risk coming from monetary shocks. Table
4 shows that the covariance of relative consumption and nominal exchange rate, conditional on
monetary shocks, does not change sign across di⁄erent policy regimes, but across di⁄erent price-
setting assumptions for a given a policy regime. That is, a monetary expansion leads to a rise in
adjusted relative consumption, as well as a depreciation in home currency, ie ^ CR
t ￿ ^ Qt=￿ " and
^ rx;t "; under both policy regimes if prices are set in producer￿ s currency. However, if prices are set
in buyer￿ s currency, a monetary expansion at home actually depresses relative consumption, while
depreciating domestic currency, ie ^ CR
t ￿ ^ Qt=￿ # and ^ rx;t " :
What explains this di⁄erence in the response of adjusted relative consumption, ^ CR
t ￿ ^ Q=￿; to
a home monetary expansion across PCP and LCP? Under PCP, a domestic monetary expansion
that depreciates the nominal exchange rate also worsens the terms of trade given that import and
export prices are sticky in the currency of the producer.28 Depreciation in the terms of trade shifts
27See Benigno and Benigno (2008) and Clarida and Waldman (2007) for the analysis of nominal exchange rate
dynamics under di⁄erent policy rules in a sticky price model with PCP, and Benigno (2004) for an LCP model.
28Under PCP, TOTt = ^ P
￿
F;t+ ^ St￿ ^ PH;t: Since ^ PH;t and ^ P
￿
F;t are sticky in home and foreign currencies, respectively,
26the world demand towards the cheaper home good. Consumption increases in both countries, but
by more in the home country. Real exchange rate depreciates due to home bias in consumption.
Overall, given the strong expenditure-switching e⁄ects created by a home currency depreciation,
consumption of home agents increase by more compared to foreign agents in purchasing power
terms under PCP.
Under LCP, on the other hand, a domestic monetary expansion that depreciates the nominal
exchange rate does not generate expenditure-switching e⁄ects like it does under PCP, because
foreign currency price of home good does not fall. Revenues of home exporters increase, which
improves the home terms of trade and raises the value of home output.29 Thus, home consumption
increases by much more than in the PCP case and foreign consumption falls due to the worsening
in foreign terms of trade. So, under LCP relative consumption, ^ CR
t = ^ Ct ￿ ^ C￿
t ; increases by much
more in response to a domestic monetary expansion than under PCP. But, the real exchange rate
also depreciates by much more under LCP compared to the PCP case - so much that relative
consumption adjusted for purchasing power, ^ CR
t ￿ ^ Q=￿; slightly falls in the face of a positive
monetary shock.30 This result is in line with the literature which shows that the presence of pricing
to market increases exchange rate volatility relative to the case in which law of one price holds.31
Given the discussion on the comovement of relative consumption and excess returns under
di⁄erent price-setting assumptions, the optimal hedge against monetary shocks under LCP is to
go long in the foreign bond irrespective of the policy regime, while the opposite is true for PCP.32
Consequently, for a money-growth rule, it is optimal to have a bigger long position in foreign bonds
under LCP compared to ￿ exible prices or PCP, because in this case hedging against monetary shocks
also requires a long position in foreign currency, reinforcing the e⁄ect coming from productivity
shocks. However, under PCP, monetary shocks a⁄ect the covariance between relative consumption
and excess returns in the opposite way as productivity shocks and therefore a smaller long position
in FX is optimal. A similar reasoning applies to an in￿ ation-targeting Taylor rule. For this regime,
the short position in FX is magni￿ed under PCP and reduced under LCP (Tables 3 and 4).
The result presented above implies that, for a su¢ ciently large relative variance of monetary
home terms of trade depreciates following a monetary expansion that depreciates the nominal exchange rate.
29Under LCP, TOTt = ^ PF;t ￿ ^ P
￿
H;t ￿ ^ St: Since ^ PF;t and ^ P
￿
H;t are sticky in home and foreign currencies, respectively,
home terms of trade appreciates following a monetary expansion that depreciates the nominal exchange rate.
30To understand the real exchange rate response under LCP, it is useful to decompose it in terms of the deviation
from the law of one price in each country and home terms of trade:
^ Qt = ￿( ^ P
￿
H;t + ^ St ￿ ^ PH;t) + ￿( ^ P
￿
F;t + ^ St ￿ ^ PF;t) + (2￿ ￿ 1)( ^ PF;t ￿ ^ P
￿
H;t ￿ ^ St)
Despite the fact that the home terms of trade improves following an expansionary monetary shock, real exchange rate
depreciates because of the deviation from the law of one price in each country, which are equal because of symmetry.
31For example, see Betts and Devereux (2000).
32Note that in the ￿ exible price case, the optimal hedge against monetary shocks is to have zero portfolio as
discussed in Section 2.
27shocks, optimal foreign bond position might be negative under a passive policy when prices are
sticky in the producer￿ s currency and positive under an in￿ ation-targeting policy when prices are
sticky in the buyer￿ s currency. Table 3 shows how portfolios change when monetary shocks are
twice and ten times more volatile than productivity shocks, ie ￿2
A=￿2
M = 0:5, and ￿2
A=￿2
M = 0:1:
First of all, bond portfolios shrink in size as monetary shocks become more important. Secondly,
increasing the size of monetary shocks a⁄ects portfolios less under a Taylor rule compared to a
money-growth rule because the reaction to in￿ ation in the Taylor rule partially o⁄sets the increase
in the variance.33 Therefore, foreign bond position does not switch sign under Taylor rule with LCP
even when monetary shocks are ten times more volatile than productivity shocks. All in all, for
reasonable calibrations of the relative variance, the link between policy regimes and foreign bond
positions is robust to the introduction of sticky prices in the model.
Valuation e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks under sticky prices
Under the benchmark calibration, a monetary expansion that generates 1% depreciation in
domestic currency creates a positive valuation e⁄ect up to 2% of GDP under a money-growth rule
and a negative valuation e⁄ect up to -2% of GDP under a Taylor rule depending on the price-setting
assumption (Table 3). However, this valuation e⁄ect on international bond positions created by
monetary policy shocks is small when compared with the conventional e⁄ect coming from the slow
adjustment of prices. For example, the negative valuation e⁄ect that follows a monetary expansion
under a Taylor rule is not enough to make monetary policy beggar-thy-self as in the case of ￿ exible
prices (where there is no other channel for the transmission of monetary shocks except the valuation
channel). Figure 4 shows how the valuation channel works in the case of a Taylor rule with PCP
by comparing the impulse responses from a non-contingent bond economy (zero-portfolio solution)
with those from the model with trade in two nominal bonds. The di⁄erence between the dashed
line and the solid line is due to the valuation channel.
As can be seen from the impulse response of NFA in Figure 4, the valuation e⁄ect of a monetary
expansion is negative, but the response of home and foreign consumption, real exchange rate and
other variables are not much a⁄ected by the fall in NFA, because this channel is dominated by
the conventional sticky-price channel. The only variable that is a⁄ected most signi￿cantly by the
valuation channel is relative home consumption adjusted for the real exchange rate, which shows
deviations from perfect risk-sharing.
4.3.1 A more general speci￿cation of the Taylor rule
A standard Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)) speci￿es that interest rates respond to divergences of in-
￿ ation from target and output from trend. Here we consider a set-up where the central bank
33See equation 28 and the related discussion in Section 2 for the ￿ exible price argument.
28responds to in￿ ation and output growth. Arguably, a rule that responds to output growth rather
than the output gap (de￿ned as the deviation of actual output from its e¢ cient level) might not
be consistent with a central bank that cares about social welfare. We allow for such speci￿cation
in order to consider the case that the monetary policy has some preference for stabilising output
itself. The analysis of this rule will be an alternative way of assessing the implications of having a
more accommodative policy.34
Figure 5 examines the e⁄ects of increasing the weight on output stabilisation in the Taylor rule
￿y. The case of ￿y = 0 corresponds to the set-up where the central bank only targets in￿ ation and
is analysed above. In this special case, the domestic currency depreciates in response to a positive
endowment shock and agents would want to hold a portfolio that is short in foreign bonds (ie the
steady share foreign bond position is negative). Expansionary domestic monetary policy shocks
cause a domestic nominal depreciation which triggers negative valuation e⁄ects at home.
However, as Figure 5 illustrates, this result is overturned as ￿y increases. Then positive endow-
ment shocks that raise output would require the central bank to raise interest rates, appreciating
the domestic currency in nominal terms. This di⁄erent exchange rate dynamic has been empha-
sised by Clarida and Waldman (2007) and Benigno and Benigno (2008). In response to this new
exchange rate dynamic, agents would now choose to hold less domestic and more foreign bonds.
As a consequence of this change in the international portfolio position, domestic monetary shocks
can trigger positive valuation e⁄ects.
Note that in our set-up, the weight on output stabilisation, ￿y, only needs to be slightly positive
to overturn the results obtained under a pure in￿ ation-targeting Taylor rule. So the case of a
Taylor rule with a small weight on output stabilisation has similar implications for the international
transmission of monetary policy as the results obtained under money-growth rule. Therefore our
results suggests that the relevant classi￿cation of policy rules distinguishes between those that focus
solely on in￿ ation stabilisation and those that do not.
5 Conclusion
Over recent decades, the external balance sheets of countries have grown in size. At the same time,
the currency denomination of those balance sheets has changed. While some countries have most
of their foreign debt liabilities denominated in domestic currency, in others most debt liabilities are
in foreign currency (Lane and Shambough (2009)). In our model, the optimal portfolio currency
34Note that a speci￿cation of the Taylor rule that responds to output gap - de￿ned as deviations of actual output
from its ￿ exible price allocation - would not change our results (at least in qualitative terms). This is because the
objective of targeting the ￿ exible price allocation is no di⁄erent than the objective of targeting stable in￿ ation. We
actually run this sensitivity analysis and ￿nd that the presence of an output gap in the Taylor rule would make the
FX position even more negative.
29shares are directly linked to exchange rate dynamics. Whether the domestic currency depreciates or
appreciates in periods of low domestic income determines whether investors take a long or a short
position in the foreign currency. The key insight of our analysis is that di⁄erent monetary regimes
change the cyclical properties of the exchange rate which then a⁄ects the hedging characteristic of
domestic over foreign bonds. Speci￿cally, if the central bank is assumed to target money growth,
or follows a Taylor rule which puts weight on output stabilisation, agents would choose a portfolio
that is short in domestic bonds and long in foreign bonds. This is because, with such rules, any
adverse real country-speci￿c shocks will be associated with a nominal depreciation of the domestic
currency. Holding domestic currency denominated assets is therefore a bad hedge. On the other
hand, when the central bank conducts policy through an in￿ ation-targeting Taylor-type rule, the
same adverse shock will trigger a nominal domestic currency appreciation. So holding domestic
currency denominated assets is a good hedge and agents will choose an optimal portfolio that is
overweight in home bonds.
We also show how the endogenous portfolio choice determines the cross-border transmission of
monetary policy shocks via a valuation channel. In the case of money-growth rules, agents are long
in foreign bonds and monetary policy shocks then trigger international valuation e⁄ects that are
beggar-thy-neighbour. In contrast, monetary policy shocks with a Taylor rule cause international
valuation e⁄ects that are beggar-thy-self since agents are holding a portfolio that is short in foreign
bonds.
Our results on the optimal portfolio under di⁄erent monetary policy regimes appear in line with
the ￿ndings of Clarida and Waldman (2007) and Lane and Shambough (2010). When put together,
the empirical evidences from these papers tend to suggest that in￿ ation-targeting countries are
inclined to hold relatively more foreign debt liabilities denominated in foreign currency than non
in￿ ation targeting countries. But we believe that a clear look at the data on the link between
policy regimes, hedging motives and portfolio positions would be an interesting avenue for future
research.
30Figures
Figure 1: Impulse responses following a monetary shock under a money-growth regime (X-axis:
periods measured in quarters; Y-axis: percentage deviations from steady state)
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31Figure 2: Impulse responses following a monetary shock (standardised to give one standard devia-
tion increase in money growth) under a Taylor rule (X-axis: periods measured in quarters; Y-axis:
percentage deviations from steady state)
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32Figure 3: Steady-state foreign bond position, initial response of nominal exchange rate and con-
sumption to an expansionary home monetary shock with respect to persistence, relative variance








































































33Figure 4: Impulse responses following an expansionary monetary shock under Taylor rule with
sticky prices and PCP (X-axis: periods measured in quarters; Y-axis: percentage deviations from
steady state)
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34Figure 5: Steady-state foreign bond position and initial response of real exchange rate adjusted
relative consumption and nominal exchange rate under zero-portfolio to a 1% productivity and
(expansionary) monetary shock under PCP (top row) and LCP (bottom row) for di⁄erent values
of Taylor rule reaction to output
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35Appendix A: Deriving conditions determining optimal shares
We use the ￿rst-order approximation to the model equations to evaluate the portfolio orthogonality
condition coming from the second-order approximation to the portfolio choice equations.
The ￿rst-order approximation to the accumulation of net foreign assets given by equation (9)












t￿1 ￿ ~ ￿(^ rF;t ￿ ^ rH;t) + ^ P￿
F;t ￿ ^ P￿
t + ^ Y ￿
F;t ￿ ^ C￿
t (36)






t￿1 + 2~ ￿^ rx;t + ^ Y R
t ￿ ^ CR
t + ^ Qt
where \ NFAR
t = \ NFAt ￿ \ NFA
￿
t; rx;t = rF;t ￿ rH;t (excess return on foreign bonds expressed in
home currency), ^ Y R
t = ^ PH;t + ^ YH;t ￿ ( ^ P￿
F;t + ^ St + ^ Y ￿
F;t) (relative non-￿nancial income adjusted for
the terms of trade), ^ CR
t = ^ Ct ￿ ^ C￿
t and ^ Qt = ^ P￿
t + ^ St ￿ ^ Pt:
The second dynamic equation we have is the combined Euler equations, ie equation (16) in the
text:
Et ^ CR





Et ^ Qt+1 ￿ ^ Qt
￿
We can solve equations (15) and (16) forward for NFAR
t and CR
t as a function of NFAt￿1; ~ ￿^ rx;t;
^ Y R
t and ^ Qt :
\ NFA
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t+1+j+2(1￿￿)~ ￿^ rx;t+ ^ Y R
t + ^ Qt
(38)
We get the equation for ￿ ^ CR
t+1 ￿ ￿
^ Qt+1
￿ given in equation (17) in the text by using (37) and
(38):
35Note that in Section 2 of the text we de￿ned ￿ = ￿F and mentioned that we can de￿ne all other portfolio shares
































Appendix B: Equations of the sticky price model
Here, we present the important equations of the sticky price model discussed in Section 4.3 in the
main text.
Consumers
The representative agent in the home economy now also gets disutility from work as well as
utility from consumption and real money holdings. So the expected present discounted value of



































where $ > 0; K > 0 and Ls is the hours worked.
The consumption index and the associated price index are given in equations (5) and (6) with
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods denoted by ￿: CH and CF are now
composite indices of domestic and foreign varieties. The elasticity of substitution between varieties
produced within a country is ￿ > 1:
The budget constraint and the de￿nition of asset returns are as before. Note that total income
that accrues to the home agent, PH;tYt in equation (7), is now the sum of pro￿ts and wage income,
ie PH;tYt = Pt￿t + WtLt; where ￿ denotes real pro￿ts of home ￿rms and Wt is nominal wage.
Firms
Firms have market power over the supply of their products. Each ￿rm produces a single variety
of the home consumption good according to the production technology:
Yt = AtLt
37where At is a common stochastic productivity shock that follows an AR(1) process.
logAt = ￿ logAt￿1 + ut; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, ut is i:i:d with Et￿1[ut] = 0;V art￿1[ut] = ￿2
u
Prices change at random intervals ￿ la Calvo. At each period a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1) of randomly
selected ￿rms cannot change their prices. The remaining 1 ￿ ￿ fraction of ￿rms chooses prices
optimally to maximise expected discounted value of future pro￿ts.
Each ￿rm in home country chooses the optimal home and foreign market price, ~ PH;t and ~ P￿
H;t,
















where ￿ is the stochastic discount factor and ~ YH;t and ~ Y ￿
H;t are the demand for home good from the
home market and the demand for home good from the foreign market, respectively and are given









































j=0 ￿j￿t+j ~ YH;t+j
(44)
The foreign currency price can be set in two ways depending on the currency in which home exports
are invoiced. Under producer currency pricing (PCP), exporters in both countries set export prices
in their own currency. Home ￿rms maximise equation (41) with respect to St+j ~ P￿
H;t and the optimal








On the other hand, under local currency pricing (LCP), export prices are set in the destination
market￿ s currency. Maximising equation (41) with respect to ~ P￿
H;t gives the following equation for
















j=0 ￿j￿t+jSt+j ~ Y ￿
H;t+j
(46)
Under Calvo price-setting, the price indices PH;t and P￿
H;t can be written as follows:
PH;t =
h

















Optimal prices for the foreign goods sold in the domestic market and abroad, ~ P￿
F;t and ~ PF;t as well
as P￿
F;t and PF;t are derived in a similar way.
Policy rules are as described in Section 2.2 and equilibrium conditions are as in Section (2:3).
In addition to the Euler equations and the money demand equation given by (10) and (11), there








The law of one price no longer holds in the sticky price model with LCP, but it continues to
hold if exports are priced according to PCP.
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